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The Swedish system of social security has often been regarded as a model of 
comprehensive coverage and inclusiveness. Despite facing repeated financial 
challenges through the 1990s and 2000s, it has maintained its essential character as 
a popular and well-endowed provider of social stability for both the individual and 
the state itself. Employment-related benefits are generous in financial terms, but come 
with the need for recipients to remain actively engaged in the economic or 
educational field. However, Sweden’s huge geographical and demographic diversity 
made it increasingly necessary to increase the role of local authorities in 
implementing active labour market policies. This article tracks these developments 
since the mid-1990s, both with regard to changing the benefits system and with 
regard to changing local government involvement. It argues that backed by broad 
political support from economic actors, political parties and large sections of the 
population, the Swedish system has achieved the necessary modernisation and 
adaptation to remain a viable alternative to more neo-liberal welfare retrenchment 
projects conducted in other European countries.        
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A POLITICAL COMMITMENT 
 
  
Sweden with its strong traditions reaching back to the 1930s is often regarded the archetypal 
social-democratic welfare state in terms of Göran Esping-Andersen’s classic typology of 
welfare regimes, distinguishing conservative, liberal and social-democratic approaches 
(Esping-Anderson, 1990). This reputation has been earned over decades of sustained 
commitment by Swedish governments, regardless of their party-political composition. A 
universality of welfare state coverage, where “social programmes…are not targeted to ‘the 
poor’ but instead cover the entire population without consideration of their ability to pay” 
(Rothstein, 2002:209-10) does, however, depend on a sufficient national consensus to 
maintain the high-tax environment necessary to generate sufficient funds to pay for the 
promised provisions. Whether such a consensus can be maintained has been the subject of 
recent debates in the literature. Proponents of the ‘compensation hypothesis’ (e.g., Meinhard 
and Potrafke, 2012) argue that especially in times of economic downturn and increased 
competition there is a need and a desire to ensure social protection at the price of higher 
taxes. By contrast, proponents of the ‘efficiency hypothesis’ argue that high tax levels are 
likely to induce capital flight to more liberal regimes which offer lower tax rates at the price 
of less individual protection (e.g., Rothstein and Steinmo, 2002; Deveraux et al., 2008). The 
similarities of experience in economic conditions have led to similar welfare state reforms 
and led to some observable convergence trends between the welfare systems in Europe, as 
shown for instance in a recent study by Wolfgang Schroeder and colleagues (Schroeder et al, 
2015). This is not to say, however that specific national approaches to welfare state 
development are no longer possible or sustainable. Indeed as Steinmo also showed as early as 
2003 (Steinmo, 2003), before the recent period Conservative-led governments (2006-2014) of 
Sweden would be a likely candidate for maintaining a strong welfare state commitment rather 
than being roped easily into a European trend of welfare state retrenchment.   
 Having said that, It must also be noted that the most advanced notions of a universal 
welfare state discussed in the late 1980s and early 1990s have been found unsustainable, in 
particular the concept of decommodifying labour – effectively ending the classic liberal 
scenario which puts “people’s rights to survive outside the market at stake (Esping-Andersen, 
1990:35) and replacing it with a social model in which “individuals, or families, can uphold a 
socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation [… and] work 
approaches fee choice rather than necessity” (Esping-Andersen, 1990:37). Going beyond 
mere poverty prevention, such a welfare regime would not only remove significant social 
differences between those in and out of work, but would also regard prolonged periods of 
non-participation in the labour market as socially acceptable. Esping-Andersen’s concepts 
were of course not designed as a social utopia, and a real decommodification of labour was 
never really achieved or even attempted in Sweden or any other Scandinavian over West 
European society – the essential character of a market economy was clearly maintained, both 
before and even more so after the commencement of membership in the European Union. 
However, the present Swedish welfare system features three key elements which 
taken together do come close to the concept of universal coverage: (i) a comprehensive 
system of social services, (ii) various cash benefits not related to employment, and (iii) a 
separate system of employment-related cash benefits and opportunities for active 
participation in the economic life of the society. The first of these elements, social services, 
includes healthcare, childcare, education and various recreational services, and is paid for 
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through a mixture of central and local taxation. Here, the central government focuses on 
regulation and setting standards (see Social Services Act, 2001), while it is one of the core 
functions of local authorities to develop locally appropriate solutions for the actual provision 
to the local population, who in turn fund the bulk of the associated expenses through local 
taxation, notably local income tax which his the main form of income tax in Sweden. In this 
area, local authorities enjoy a significant degree of autonomy, and local taxpayers therefore 
can usually literally see directly how their taxes were utilised. By contrast, the system of cash 
benefits not related to employment is highly centralised, with limited local authority 
involvement. The regulations are set out in the Social Insurance Code 2010 and administered 
by the Social Insurance Fund (Försäkringskassa). While health insurance pay-outs and 
pensions are the largest elements of the Fund’s expenses, Chapter 9 of the Social Insurance 
Code 2010 lists no less than 19 other individual types of benefits a Swedish citizen may apply 
if he or she meets the relevant conditions. While some of the benefits are means tested, e.g. 
housing benefit, the most important benefits such as child-related benefits and health-related 
benefits constitute absolute entitlements regardless of the applicant’s means. The funding 
comes from a mixture of compulsory insurance contributions by both employers and 
employees, topped up as necessary out of general taxation. Where appropriate, the Social 
Insurance Fund works  in co-operation with local social service authorities (socialnämd) and 
public as well as private local social service providers. Financial responsibilities, case co-
ordination and data exchange between the different institutions and services posed a constant 
challenge (Palme, 2001:11), which was a key motivation for the introduction of the Social 
Services Act 2001. The act fixed the individual administrative and financial responsibilities 
for various types of service which may have a bearing on a person’s employability, e.g. 
medical rehabilitation. The administrative structures were thus in place to manage the 
extensive social security system. 
The main part of this study investigates the third element of the Swedish welfare 
system, i.e. the development of the system of employment-related benefits and its 
increasingly close link to innovative ways and means of implementing labour market policies 
since the start of the gradual reform process in the second half of the 1990s. The next chapter 
discusses the Swedish policy of activation for all recipients of employment-related social 
security benefits, creating a challenge for local authorities at the communal level – in 
particular in urban areas with high concentrations of benefit recipients. The final part of the 
investigation discusses the parallel adjustment of local government functions and communal 
funding arrangements which led to increased decentralisation of labour market policy 
implementation and allowed local authorities to develop into significant actors in shaping 
local labour markets.      
 
 
 
ACTIVATION: A SOLUTION FOR EVERYONE? 
 
The Swedish social security system which emerged from the various reforms since the mid-
1990s can still be characterised as extensive and complex. It has by and large retained its 
general separation between employment-related support entitlements and entitlements based 
on personal and family circumstances. Contrary to common practice in other EU countries 
such as Germany and the UK, there is a less intensive cross-testing of a recipient’s means 
between the different types of benefit, although basic safeguards to prevent abuse, such as a 
comprehensive data exchange between institutions, have been strengthened since the early 
2000s.  
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Since its introduction 1997, a key feature of the Swedish unemployment legislation 
has been to provide a level of social security for unemployed persons which avoids 
immediate financial difficulties and enables the jobseeker to maintain a significant degree of 
economic autonomy and stability. This is not to say that the aim of the legislation would be to 
promote the decommodification of labour idea. As we will see, quite the opposite is the case. 
The dual aim of the legislation is to ensure actual social security, if necessary over very 
prolonged periods of time, but at the same time to provide a large variety of ways and means 
which enables the jobseeker to utilise his or her ability, limited as it may be, to contribute to 
the economic life of the society – either in the regular labour market, or in alternative forms 
of activity which are regarded as equally socially acceptable and are appropriate to the 
individuals abilities, age and qualifications. This broad-ranging concept of activation, which 
attempts to find an appropriate work, training, or personal qualification activity for literally 
every single jobseeker forms the very centre of integrating employment-related welfare 
provision and pursuing active labour market policies. The theme of universality is reiterated 
the state’s dual commitment of providing not only support but also opportunity for everyone 
who remains actively engaged with the system, and only those individuals who deliberately 
choose to disengage run the risk of serious social exclusion.         
In terms of labour market management, the National Labour Market Administration is 
in charge of typical labour market management functions such as registering unemployed 
persons, and ensuring that jobseekers are indeed actively engaged in searching for jobs 
(arbetsförmedling), as well as maintaining a national register of vacancies and providing 
various employer support services – including a range of wage subsidies for certain types of 
employment – to help maintaining vibrant national and local labour markets. However, the 
administration does not handle employment-related benefits.  
The Swedish primary unemployment insurance is still voluntary, and run by 28 
individual sectoral insurance schemes, plus one non-sectoral scheme available to any 
employee. The sectoral schemes operate privately or under the auspices of trade unions, but 
with significant regulatory oversight and financial input by the state (Arbetslöshetskassa, 
commonly known as A-Kassa), and are often the first line of defence for ensured employees 
who lose their job. Members of these voluntary unemployment insurance schemes initially 
receive income replacement of up to 80% of their former wages for the first 100 days, 
dropping to 70% for the following 200-350 days, depending on personal circumstances, up to 
a monthly maximum allowance which in 2015 was raised to 25,025 per month 
(Arbetslöshetskassa.nu, 2015). For high income earners and members of some trade unions 
top-up income replacement insurance schemes are available to exceed the daily and monthly 
allowances. However, over the last ten years there has been a significant drop of income 
replacement receivers across the country (see Table 1).     
 
Table 1 here   
 
This drop cannot be explained by a general reduction in unemployment, as the annual 
average of registered jobseekers has remained relatively constant between 650,000 and 
710,000 since 2004 (EUROSTAT, 2015). A partial explanation, however, can be found in a 
change in the financial interrelationship between the state and the insurance schemes which 
occurred in 2008. Until 2007 the state was covering an increasing amount of the actual 
insurance payments, up to 90% for some schemes, and attempted to recoup at least some of 
these expenses by increasing the payments which the schemes had to make to the state for 
every member who did not receive benefits. Instigated by the then Conservative-led coalition 
government headed by Prime Minister Reinfeldt, the 2008 reform turned this system upside 
down: now the financial handovers to the state depend on the sum of insurance payed out. 
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Schemes with more unemployed members are thus financially disadvantaged, thus attempting 
to hold the schemes – and indirectly also the trade unions which stand behind the schemes – 
responsible for developments in their sector’s labour market situation. For Öman (2008:21), 
this change “will contribute to strengthening further the driving forces for a responsible 
development of wages, which does not lead to unemployment and strengthens the incitement 
to avoid wrongly payed income replacement”. Cost saving, abuse control, and indirect 
pressure on wage levels can indeed be described typical ingredients of conservative, if not 
neo-liberal labour market policies. For critics from the Social Democrat corner (Persson et 
al., 2010; Petterson, 2012) financial pressure put on unemployment insurance schemes was 
only a part of a wider campaign by the Reinfeldt government to drive down the quality of the 
social security system without actually changing its general operation. As Petterson (2012: 
287) points out, higher membership fees for insurance schemes and those union memberships 
which contain an insurance element while freezing pay-outs at levels set in 2001, not only 
contributed to a decline in union membership but also opened the door for purely private 
insurance and service providers as the state became less trusted to deliver expected levels of 
social security and support.       
However, perhaps the most interesting element of the Swedish social security system 
is the support scheme provided by the state for longer-term unemployed persons whose 
insurance period has run out, and for not previously insured jobseekers – the Activity Grant. 
It consists of fixed daily allowances which are not related to previous income but depend on 
age and qualifications. The scheme comes in two versions, the actual Activity Grant for 
previously insured workers and workers over the age of 25, featuring higher daily rates but 
counted as taxable income, and a Development Grant with much lower but tax-free daily 
allowance rates, for workers under 25 who were not previously insured. There is no time 
limit on how long a jobseeker may remain in these schemes, although the daily allowances 
are somewhat reduced after the first 100 days. At the time of writing (Summer 2015), the 
Social Insurance Fund lists approx. 144.000 jobseekers – roughly one fifth of the total 
number of jobseekers – as recipients of Activity Grant or Development Grants (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2 here  
 
This stable and in financial terms quite generous level of state support also comes 
with an element of compulsion – work or learn: “doing nothing is not an option” (Löfven, 
NYU speech 2014). This statement is to be taken literally. The basic requirement is to 
participate in an approved labour market policy programme on a full-time basis, attendance is 
registered and allowances calculated for every working day. In addition to the requirement of 
conducting usual searches for jobs in the regular labour market, Activity Grant recipients are 
usually asked to attend longer-term placements with companies or public institutions with a 
view to taking up a similar position in the regular labour market later on, shorter term 
placements for re-orientation towards an alternative career track, or participation in specific 
skill-enhancing training programmes to enhance personal employability. In the Development 
Grant scheme, the emphasis shifts strongly to participation in suitable educational measures, 
e.g. previously missed school qualifications, language courses if needed, or attending 
vocational training courses.  
These requirements were introduced in 1997, the year in which the decade of high 
unemployment and maximum benefit pay-outs (1991-2001) reached its peak with an 
unemployment rate exceeding 10% and nearly 400,000 households receiving some form of 
benefits (Johansson, 2006:23-24). However, the then Social Democrat-led government had 
not only set a course for keeping a close watch on both long-term unemployed jobseekers and 
on the next generation of jobseekers, it had also challenged itself to provide the means for 
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jobseekers to follow these directions. The realisation of this challenge came soon after, and a 
number of short-lived employment creation programmes were introduced in 1998. A more 
systematic solution was embarked upon from 2001 on, with the still operational policy of an 
activity guarantee and a development guarantee underpinning the respective grant schemes. 
The central feature of this guarantee is a personalised Jobseeker’s Agreement 
containing an action plan which not only covers actual job seeking requirements but also the 
provision of a place in a job placement or training scheme and a list of qualification and 
personal development aims according to the individual jobseeker’s needs. According to 
Johansson (2006:33) the government’s aims of this guarantee were four-fold: (i) to provide a 
way for the jobseeker to stay connected to the world of work and eventually provide a route 
back into regular employment, (ii) to avoid a cycle of periods of active work and inactive 
unemployment, (iii) to ensure active job seeking even while participating in a job placement 
or training programme, and (iv) to ensure equal activation opportunities for disadvantaged 
groups of jobseekers, including jobseekers not fully fit for work or jobseekers born outside 
Sweden, with large concentrations of the latter living in the larger urban communities.  
Indeed, as shown in Table 2 the urban problem is still in evidence as the largest 
concentrations of  Activity Grant recipients can be found in Stockholm, Skåne (Malmö) and 
Västra Götland (Göteborg). The uneven distribution of Activity Grant recipients across the 
country therefore created a stronger challenge in the larger communities. The programme was 
therefore implemented unevenly in larger communities. A recent study on the Stockholm 
region  for instance found evidence that in some city districts the activation programme was 
not fully rolled out until 2004, and that on some occasions the activation consisted of long 
hours of daily attendance at the job centre rather than participation in a job placement or 
training measure (Hanspers, 2013:27-28). Another, at first glance very effective way of 
handling large numbers of jobseekers is to place them together in special companies created 
for this purpose, where work, training and other support measures could be concentrated in a 
single location. However, an interesting case study of the state-owned manufacturing 
company Samhall with nearly 22,000 employees who are in need of some kind of 
professional or personal rehabilitation (Holmkvist, 2009:10) indicates that such large 
concentrations of individuals with development needs and the concentrated supply of support 
resources may reinforce rather than reduce dependency:  
 
Essentially, people suffering from various ‘impairments’ who are recruited by Samhall learn to become 
disabled by participating in the work organization that adapted to the presumed needs of disabled 
people. Hence, occupationally disabled people are reproduced through the activation offered by 
Samhall. The longer they stay at Samhall the more disabled they become in a sociological sense – […] 
making them all the less likely to leave Samhall. (Holmkvist, 2009:153)         
 
This rather negative view is not generally shared by the institutions involved in implementing 
the activation programmes, and in particular the Social Insurance Fund has been keen to point 
out that during the 2000s there was evidence of successful transfers from long-term sickness 
insurance to activity grants and on to employment (Försäkringskassan, 2007; 2007a). Still, 
the years of the Reinfeldt government (2006-2014) can be characterised by a stagnation in 
conceptual development regarding activation measures for the individual. Policy discussions 
focussed by and large on the reallocation of costs and responsibilities between the state 
agencies and local authorities as discussed below, and on ways of increasing the role of the 
private sector in providing various types of social service. Since taking office in 2014, the 
new Löfven government has indicated a renewed state commitment to maintaining and 
funding an effective social security system. While the concept of activation for all will 
remain in place and an individual’s disengagement from the system will not be financially 
rewarded, everyone should be able to find a suitable place in society which ensures  personal 
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economic stability while being engaged in an a task which meets individual needs. How well 
this commitment can be sustained over the coming years remains to be seen.     
 
 
 
STRENGTHENING LOCAL AUTONOMY 
 
The principle of local authorities’ primary responsibility in social matters – excluding cash 
benefits – is historically grown. Since the 1970s, local authorities were strongly involved in 
providing social services, but were acting essentially as implementation agencies for national 
policy decisions, and were financially compensated for this activity by receiving task-specific 
earmarked funds from the government. In effect, the then situation can be characterised as 
local self-administration rather than local self-determination (Bergmark, 2001:29).  
A significant change in this situation occurred as part of a comprehensive attempt to 
strengthen local autonomy, set out in the Local Government Act 1991 (Sveriges Riksdag, 
1991). Local authorities were given the responsibility for developing their own local range 
social services provisions, co-financed through local taxation and government block grants to 
ensure that national minimum standards in service provisions can be met. The early years of 
working with this legislation proved difficult, as they coincided with the previously 
mentioned crisis decade of the 1990s. Due to falling tax receipts, local authorities found it 
particularly difficult to build up any financial reserves as required by the new law and by 
1995 often did not manage to balance their books (Häggroth, 1995:7-8). Furthermore, the 
new rules created significant differences between communities in terms of availability and 
quality of services, and there was increased evidence of a conflict between local authorities’ 
savings aims and the government’s welfare provision aims (Bergmark, 2001:27). The 
problem was further increased when in 1995 the cost for programmes to combat youth 
unemployment and long-term unemployment were transferred from the state-funded job 
centres to the local authorities (Bergmark, 2001:35), and in 1996 the responsibility for 
medication costs were transferred from the Social Insurance Fund to the local councils 
(Försäkringskassan, 2007a:30).  
The government, however, was not able to gain financially in these processes, as the 
need to provide block grants to balance local authority budgets took away savings on direct 
expenditure through the centrally managed institutions. A key step in stabilising the 
relationship between state and local authorities regarding social security matters was the 
introduction of a new Social Services Act, 2001 (Sveriges Riksdag, 2001). The act 
strengthened the principle of local authorities’ primary responsibility in all social matters. 
More importantly, however, it regulated more clearly general social services entitlements, 
funding responsibilities and conditions for providing local social services not related to 
employment (Sveriges Riksdag, 2001). However, it did not resolve the issue of balancing the 
local authority budgets. How to achieve sustainable local budgets remained a central theme of 
welfare state debates throughout the 2000s.  
he change to a Conservative-led government in 2006 led to increased attempts by the 
government to use the principle of local autonomy to reduce central government 
involvement, both in terms of target setting and in terms of financial exposure through the 
block grant system. Sweden had emerged from the 2007-8 global economic crisis relatively 
swiftly, and according to Olssson (2011:49), local authorities in 2010 faced a shortfall of only 
about SEK 9bn, or 0.3% of the Swedish GDP. Two ideas for the stabilisation of local 
government funding were therefore discussed. A more radical solution, proposed by Stig 
Nyman (Nyman, 2012:413-15) consisted of the introduction of a Communal Stabilisation 
Fund, operating like an insurance policy. Each local authority would pay in an annual fixed 
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amount based on population size – independent of any economic cycles. In years in which 
expected levels of tax revenue were not reached, the Fund would pay out to cover the 
shortfall. If necessary in times of crisis, the Fund itself would have to take out loans on the 
open market. Apparently that was a step too far even for the Reinfeldt government, in 
particular since this would likely result in a permanent horizontal redistribution of funds 
between local authorities, without government involvement. The alternative solution, 
proposed by Clas Olsson (Olsson, 2012:49-51) which eventually found its way into the 
legislation (Local Government Act 1991 as amended 2012, Ch. 8, §§ 3d and 5a), instead 
requires local authorities individually to set aside budget equalisation reserves – any surplus 
greater than 1% of gross income (2% for local authorities with negative equity; see §3d). 
Shortfalls in any financial year would only be covered by the government if at the end of a 
three-year waiting period could not be covered by these reserves (see §5a). The government 
would thus only be required to step in during periods of prolonged economic downturns, and 
in situations where the necessary expense structures do not allow a local authority to build up 
any reserves at all.  
The latter scenario is most likely to arise in urban areas with particularly high social 
security and service expenses. A key shift in this respect was the requirement for local 
authorities to become strongly involved in implementing the activity and development 
guarantees. While cash benefits are paid directly by the Social Insurance Fund, many of the 
costs for local vocational training programmes and other qualification schemes are firmly 
within the realm of local authority responsibilities. In part this had been the case since 1995, 
when local authorities took over active labour market policy responsibilities for young 
persons under 20 years of age from the job centres. Local Authorities were asked to develop 
so-called Communal Development Programmes through which young jobseekers would be 
offered either some training or qualification, or would participate in public work schemes run 
by the authority. Initially this can be regarded as just a way to save on costa as participation 
in a communal programme usually attracted lower social security payments and, more 
worryingly, excluded these youngsters from participation in other, potentially more attractive 
schemes run by the job centres (Johansson, 2006:25). The subsequent changes to 
unemployment legislation have obviated many of the mid-1990s changes, but two elements 
remain: we still have the separation between younger and older workers (with the 25th 
birthday now marking the separation), featuring different payment scales, and we still find a 
strong, and indeed growing involvement of local authorities in labour market policy 
programmes. It is now possible to place workers of all ages in communal work projects as 
part of their Activity Grant or Development Grant scheme participation, on the same benefits 
scales as for other types of activity. According to Johannson (2006:26), by 2006 the majority 
of Sweden’s nearly 300 local authorities had also created their own Employment Market 
Units to run local training schemes, to provide placements in local public sector institutions, 
and to manage occasional public works projects.  
The reorganisation of previously regionalised job centres into a unified national 
structure in 2008 (for details see Skoog, 2008) did not break the link to the local authorities. 
Indeed, an increased co-operation between national and local institutions to ensure effective 
local implementation is observable. The introduction of Service Centres one-stop-shops for 
all citizens, covering Tax Offices, Job Centres and Social Insurance Fund offices happened 
nation-wide between 2009 and 2011, although some local social services need to be accessed 
in separate locations. However, the co-operation between the national and local institutions 
focuses in particular on groups of individuals with specific needs, for which both 
administrative and financial responsibilities are shared: jobseekers under 25 years, recent 
migrants, and young persons with criminal records in urban locations. Details of on-going co-
operation projects can be found on the central Job Centres web site (Arbetsförmedlingen, 
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2015). One project here is of particular interest as it is the first foray of the Löfven 
government into the field of enhanced central-local co-operation on labour market policy 
implementation. From August 2015 a new form of training contract for jobseekers aged 20-
24 with incomplete school education is available, which his financially rewarding for both the 
jobseeker and the local authority. A participant combines attendance at an adult education 
centre to complete the school education with either part-time employment or a placement 
with a local public social service establishment – a hospital, a school, a home for the elderly, 
a home for disabled people, or a recreation centre. Therefore, the jobseeker is getting 
‘activated’ in two different ways, and the local authority receives affordable manpower 
support for the fulfilment of their other social service responsibilities. Such joined-up 
thinking is perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the Swedish social security system, and 
one can probably look forward to interesting future developments in this vein.                         
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Swedish social security system as a prime example of the Nordic welfare state concept 
has successfully retained its reputation as a strong, well-developed and popular way of 
ensuring social security for the entire society. Having faced significant economic 
sustainability challenges in both the 1990s and 2000s, the social security system has emerged 
through a series of gradual administrative, procedural and financial reforms essentially not 
only intact but in all likelihood ready to meet similar challenges in the future. In achieving 
this modernisation and sustainability, the Swedish case also provides an effective 
counterpoint to neoliberal arguments which regard welfare retrenchment, austere social 
security regimes and absolute labour market liberalisation as not only desirable but inevitable 
features of modern market economies.  
 Providing jobseekers with not only the bare necessities to survive but with both a 
solid economic base for them and their families as well as with genuine opportunities for 
building or retaining a link to the world of work is a sound response to the problem of labour 
as a commodity. Outright poverty and social hardship is avoided, while the very limited 
degree of decommodification of labour thus induced actually strengthens the link between the 
individual, the economy and also the state. To that extent the activation policy may even 
contribute to developing notions of participatory citizenship (Johansson, 2006:46-47), 
although recent evidence from urban areas with high concentrations of social problem cases 
indicates that some engagement with the social security system does not automatically 
prevent individual personal perceptions of exclusion and being disadvantaged.   
 The increased involvement of local authorities in implementing active labour market 
policies has been a significant step forward. Both the greater financial autonomy given to 
local authorities since 2012 and the improved co-operation between state and local 
institutions which developed gradually since the early 2000s have helped to create a present 
situation where it is justified to speak of locally adapted labour market policy solutions. This 
is essential in a country with very diverse local labour market situations, ranging from intense 
labour market competition in densely populated social blackspots to actual labour shortages 
in some underpopulated rural communities stretching across large territorial expanses. Local 
authorities now by and large possess the legal and financial tools to develop bespoke local 
labour market programmes which fit their local needs – similar to the situation which had 
already been established with regard to the provision of social services – but still with 
sufficient backing by the state and the Social Insurance Fund to ensure continued adherence 
to national standards of quality pf provision and an individuals’ entitlements. 
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However, it is also evident that it would be difficult to point to the Swedish system as 
a role model for other, especially larger market economies in the European Union and 
elsewhere. Not only the population but also the political leadership and the key private 
economic actors need to show a sufficient political commitment to embark on and maintain 
such a course of action. In Sweden this has not been a serious issue since the 1930s – insofar 
the ‘path dependency’ argument has shown significant salience. The broad party-political 
consensus which not only shows only limited differences in the Social Democrat – 
Conservative spectrum but also encompasses most other political parties to the left and right 
as well is testimony to this broad societal consensus. Even the right-wing Sweden Democrats 
with their ethnonationalist stance (Rydgren, 2006: 108) actually support the welfare state. 
While they do not wish to share it with anyone who arrives on Sweden’s shores, they are not 
right-wing tax populists like other parties far right in Europe.  
Such a broad societal consensus may be hard to find in other European countries 
outside the Nordic area. However, the lessons form the Swedish case may not be lost on 
equally close-knit regional communities which find themselves at odds with the more liberal 
stances taken by their country’s governments and for which greater control over welfare and 
social security matters is at the heart of their struggle for greater autonomy or independence – 
with Scotland, the Basque Country and Catalonia being the obvious examples.            
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Table 1 Income Replacement Recipients, by Region 2005 - 2014 
Region (län) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Stockholm 93 460 84 177 62 388 47 263 53 636 56 201 49 399 49 252 52 982 51 522 
Uppsala 18 430 16 708 12 147 8 914 9 632 9 318 7 761 7 457 7 850 7 189 
Södermanland 18 009 16 724 12 767 9 961 12 219 10 838 7 977 8 215 8 672 8 098 
Östergötland 31 757 29 021 22 516 17 816 18 658 17 576 14 040 13 724 13 880 12 635 
Jönköping 18 793 16 654 12 000 9 429 14 238 12 213 8 102 8 724 9 359 7 780 
Kronoberg 9 882 8 788 6 348 4 915 7 484 6 881 4 889 5 016 5 698 4 828 
Kalmar 18 791 16 777 12 236 9 394 11 479 10 078 7 513 7 927 7 794 6 541 
Gotland 4 978 4 605 3 610 2 887 2 661 2 419 2 138 2 047 2 109 1 857 
Blekinge 12 419 11 444 8 553 7 021 7 960 7 227 5 794 5 744 5 841 5 067 
Skåne 79 260 73 270 56 004 45 493 51 387 48 585 41 676 42 368 44 993 42 420 
Halland 19 396 18 027 13 659 10 359 11 989 11 473 8 969 8 933 9 489 8 476 
Västra Götaland 99 128 92 268 68 359 52 487 69 062 63 414 46 886 48 229 50 013 44 742 
Värmland 22 076 19 883 15 104 12 228 15 222 13 876 11 030 10 602 10 883 9 685 
Örebro 22 161 20 900 15 427 11 829 14 029 12 535 9 532 9 539 10 330 9 180 
Västmanland 18 404 17 062 12 825 10 150 12 350 10 823 7 893 7 827 8 197 7 515 
Dalarna 22 493 20 552 15 838 12 137 13 300 12 073 9 675 9 448 9 555 8 583 
Gävleborg 27 124 24 567 18 900 15 056 16 159 14 457 11 552 11 759 11 762 10 462 
Västernorrland 20 351 19 107 15 358 12 664 13 055 12 612 10 404 9 726 9 473 8 498 
Jämtland 11 842 10 974 8 448 6 743 7 325 6 973 5 814 5 267 5 010 4 265 
Västerbotten 19 338 18 435 13 355 10 643 12 432 11 004 8 247 8 005 8 196 7 518 
Norrbotten 24 694 22 639 17 532 14 246 14 515 13 078 10 515 9 718 9 341 8 254 
Unknown 678 404 299 270 823 54 25 9 327 114 
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Table 2 Activity Grant Recipients by Region, July 2015 
 
Region (län) Men Women Total 
Stockholm 11,686 11,614 23,300 
Uppsala  1,502 1,719 3,221 
Södermanland 2,776 3,085 5,861 
Östergötland 4,129 4,879 9,008 
Jönköpings  2,105 2,263 4,368 
Kronoberg 1,442 1,727 3,169 
Kalmar 1,533 1,846 3,379 
Gotland 512 519 1,031 
Blekinge  1,548 1,929 3,477 
Skåne  10,816 13,101 23,917 
Hallands  1,679 1,812 3,491 
Västra Götaland 10,162 11,806 21,968 
Värmlands  2,223 2,619 4,842 
Örebro  2,047 2,474 4,521 
Västmanlands 2,192 2,545 4,737 
Dalarna 1,320 1,821 3,141 
Gävleborg 3,299 3,690 6,989 
Västernorrland 2,022 2,346 4,368 
Jämtland 790 954 1,744 
Västerbotten 1,548 2,100 3,648 
Norrbotten 1,693 2,175 3,868 
(Unknown) 43 72 115 
Sweden Total 67,067 77,096 144,163 
 
Source: Försäkringskassan, 2015  
